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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
U.C.A. 41-6-44: (1) 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii)has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control.... 
U. C. A. 41-6-1(22) 
Motor vehicle means ever vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle 
which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not 
operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized 
wheel chairs. 
U.C.A. 41-6-1(56) 
Vehicle means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or 
may be transported or drawn upon the highways, except devices used exclusively 
upon stationary rails or tracks. 
TABLE OF CASES 
AND AUTHORITIES 
U.C.A. 41-6-1(22) 8,9 
U.C.A. 41-6-1(56) 8,9 
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Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375, 383 1974).l 1 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P2nd 651 (Utah, 1982) 6,8,9 
Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023,1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) 11 
KansasCity v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d295, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) 
Key v. Kinsey, 424So.2d701, 703-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) 11 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986) 9 
Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P2nd 87 (Utah App. 1990) 7,8,9,12,14 
State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1993) 10 
State v. Bugger, 483 P2nd 442 (Utah 1971) 7,8,9 • 
State v. Ghvlin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 1977) 11 
State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958) 11 
City of Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295. 300 (Mo. App. 1976).. 11 
State v. Liebhart, 707S.W.2d427(Mo.App. 1986) 12 
Bearden v. State, 430 P.2d 844, 845-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) 12 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Defendant sought to dismiss the information after the conclusion of the State's 
case. The basis being that the car was inoperable. The Court denied such motion. Does a 
inoperable vehicle fall within the definition of the DUI statute? 
2. Defendant submitted a jury instruction defining 'actual physical control' as 
defined by prior appellate court decisions. The Court denied such an instruction and 
created its own definition of 'actual physical control'. Defendant argues that such 
instruction is contrary to the decision of this Court and in error. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant appeals from a jury trial conviction, a third degree 
felony. He was found guilty of DUI—being in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while impaired by alcohol. The defendant was sentenced and committed 
to prison for up to five (5) years. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The trial consisted of the State calling one witness, Utah Highway Patrol trooper 
Robert C. Mitchell. No other witnesses were called. 
The officer was dispatched at 9:08 p.m. on September 28, 2001 to a vehicle off 
the side of the road. He arrived by the interstate exchange of 1-15 and University 
Parkway in Orem, Utah at 9:15 p.m. T.53 L. 18/T.51 L. 17. He saw one car, a Chevrolet 
Blazer 200 feet down in the drainage grade (a gorge area) with rocks of different sizes 
about the Blazer. T. 54 L. 16. T. 55 L. 16. T. 54 L. 25. No other vehicles were present 
except this Blazer. T 57 L. 9. The defendant was seated in the driver's seat. T57 L. 17. 
The keys were on the front passenger side. T 59 L. 24. The car was stuck and would not 
start T. 60 L. 15. 
Field sobriety tests were given and the officer concluded that the defendant was 
impaired by alcohol. He arrested the defendant at 9:50 p.m. T. 82 L. 18. 
The tow truck was called and he had difficulty removing the car. He tried to get 
in and move the car by its own self-propulsion but could not. He tried to start it but 
couldn't. T. 83 L. 2. The car was inoperable. T 83 L. 18. 
The car could only be remove by pulling it out by the two truck. T. 84 L. 10. The 
car would not move on its own accord. T. 84 L. 22. 
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Officer Mitchell did not see the Blazer go into the gorge. He did not know 
who drove it there. T. 85 L. 23. The officer had no idea how long the Blazer had 
been in the gorge. T 85 L. 20./T. 87 L. 9. His observations were limited to the 35 
minutes between his arrival (9:15 p.m.) to the time of arrest ((9:50 p.m.). No 
other information was available to determine how the car came to rest in the 
gorge. The officer did not know how much the defendant had consumed or 
when. T. 86 L. 7. 
It was simply a case where the defendant is located in the driver seat of an 
inoperable Chevrolet Blazer and the Blazer is stuck 200 feet down a gorge. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a 
threat to the safety and welfare of the public. Such person poses a potential for harm. 
Actual physical control statutes seek to prohibit this 'potential for harm' before 
he/she gets in the car and attempts to drive. Here no such danger existed, the vehicle 
was inoperable. 
The statutory definition of 'vehicle' requires the ability to move. Here, the 
vehicle was stuck and would not start. It is only through the efforts of a tow truck that the 
car was removed from the gorge. 
Secondly, the State and the defense both requested a jury instruction based on 
current Utah case law. Both were denied. The trial court gave a jury instruction, which 
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defined the'actual physical coi ltroP contrary to ; tah statutoix andean KJ... K was error 
to give si ich ii istri ictioi L 
ARGUMENT 
1 THE TRIAL RT DENIED THE DEFENDA M S MOTION 
IK I  DISMISS lllli DI'TI' - ' -
CONTROL OVER AN INOPERABLE VEHICLE 
DEFINITIONS OF VEHICLE 
' I he Dl JI (41 6 44 ) stati ite prohibits the di iving oi be in ig in acti ia.1 pi i;y s ica l eoititi oil 
of a 'vehicle'. 
11 -o-1 \L.I.) defines a motor vehicle as follows: 
. > Muii'i nA/t/L means ever Minn*, wlmii Ls self-propelled and every vehicle 
u Inch is propelled hy electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but 
not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely hy human power and 
motorized ^ heel chairs. 
L.L.A + i -(>-1i 5b) defines vehicle to mean: 
« p W r . ^e in. upon, or by winch any person cn> is or ma\ ne 
transpi * drawn upon ^r V>iplm;u « rv^vp1 n ^ H ^xrlnsh^k i 
station or trad 
transporting persons or property. This inoperable Blazer did not meet the definite • < ' 
'vehicle' oi ''IIININH vehicle ' 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CON J RUL: LHG1SLTIVE INTEN1. 
The purpose for the netual physical control language is to keep the intoxicated 
persoi: i froi n di i * irig his ear I he legislati ire conclude d tl lat it is i lot enough to simpl> stc p 
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an intoxicated person from driving but, as a preventative measure, the intoxicated driver 
needs to be stopped before positioning himself to physically operate the car. The Courts 
have concluded that an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor 
vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public based on his/her potential for 
harm. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P2nd 651 (Utah, 1982), 
However, if a vehicle is not operable and no such danger exists. It is the 
potential for harm that the legislature seeks to forbid. If the car is inoperable, no such 
potential for harm exists. 
Here the defendant could not operate the car and no danger existed that the car 
was going to move. 
UTAH CASE LAW 
The genesis of Utah cases is State v. Bugger, 483 P2nd 442 (Utah 1971). There 
the Court found that the defendant, who was found asleep in an automobile parked on the 
shoulder of the road with the engine off, was not in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
The decision was that: 
(1) The Defendant was not seated in the vehicle on the traveled portion of the 
highway; 
(2) The Defendant was not attempting to steer, break or move the vehicle; and 
(3) The vehicle's engine was not running. 
No Utah Court has overruled the holding of State v. Bugger. 
In Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P2nd 87 (Utah App. 1990), the Court took care 
to distinguish State v. Bugger. In Richfield City v. Walker, the Court noted certain 
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relevant factors for the purpose of making the determinatior .1- w- whether actual nu -rsical 
contro :.au been met I he Court in its determinatioi 1 looked u> nine <*h relevant ku iors 
as follows: 
(III) vV 1: lethei the defei idant < "\ 2 " * "1 ' "p 01 aw ake w hen discos • ered; 
1 i 1 v. 1 »o siti on of the automo k ^ 
^ • 11ier the automobile's ?n< >l»>r was runninv 
::ir the defendai - -i ••, 1 -
Vi nether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant: 
- \\ hether the defendam had possession of the "»"ii^n ke\ 
ueiendaiii s apparent ability to start and move the vehicle*; 
I J.-\* die vehicle got *o wive :t vas found; and 
V ! e:h. r the defendant drove it there 
•
 : i
 inpuaMs Added) 
i he Rn hfield City v. Walker court cautioned that these factors are not to be 
;•' ' s i \ e . 
n decision in Richfield City v. Walker relied upon the Court's interpretation of 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P2nd 651 (Utah, 1982), where the Utah Supreme Court 
ei»*iu<>]" language ol the ktah implied Consent slatule should he read as intending to 
prevent die intoxicated driver from entering the vehicle, except as a passenger or passive 
occupant. •>< wo classes, one being passenger and one being a pa:>si\ c 
occupant, the suggestion is that a person can be in a position other than passenger and yet 
- - pi:--- • -i • - . • • . . ! . . } . * n;.. .. J i n c h ide a p e r s o i 1 1 \ ho 
max be in a dnu i > position 1 ».• inc eai is mopeiabk 
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The Garcia v. Schwendiman Court held that a passenger or a passive occupant as 
in Bugger, supra, would not be in actual physical control. 
The Utah Courts have failed to address the issue here of 'inoperable vehicle' but 
the suggestion is that an inoperable vehicle is outside the definition of actual physical 
control. The Richfield v. Walker decision placed key emphasis on the defendants 
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle. Here there was no ability to start and move 
the car. 
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), Lopez Court compared 
State v. Buzzer where the driver of the vehicle had parked his car completely off the road, 
had turned off the motor, and was sleeping. There the Court indicated that the driver was 
not in the driver's seat at the time he was found and arrested. The Court noted that 
positioning in the driver's seat is an element common to all of the cases that have found 
actual physical control of a motionless vehicle. The Lopez Court found that courts 
upholding convictions in these and similar fact situations start out from the premise that 
as long as a person is physically able to assert dominion by starting the car and driving 
away, he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were 
actually driving it. 
APPARENT ABILITY TO START AND MOVE THE VEHICLE 
10 
In Garcia v. Schwendirnan, 645 P.2d651 (Utah 1982), Garcia was i: :.- , 
v el licle atten lptii ig to start its i notor, b\ it apparently \ v as I it labte to :io so because of his 
intoxicated state. In front of Garcia's car was a fence and behind his the car was another 
cat parked thei e by a cot icei t ted obsei vei \ v ho 1 tad noticed Gat cia's It ltoxicated 
condition. Garcia was unable to move the vehicle more than a few feet. The Supreme 
Court held that inasmuch as there was evidence that Garcia "occupied the driver's 
position, be! lind the steering w he: c: I with possession c i the igi iltioti key and w ith. the 
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle" there had been an adequate showing of 
actual, physical, control. 1 1: le Com t noted that the objective ot the statute is to prevent 
intoxicated persons from causing harm with a vehicle. In < *;nvk:. there was a potential for 
harm although limited by the car being blocked by the fence and another car. 
1 . " ^ * i lpt to i no < ' e 
the car in order to have acluai physical control. Yet as a clement of the charge, the Court 
ihat a person needs to still have "the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle.11 
la. at 054. 
in State \ . Barniidn. •'• •' 
following: 
r u sbiiii.tuii^e. we recogm/A, the following CMablL,ii*xi icgal 
guidelines that affect a trial court's fact-finding discretion 
in these cases; ihe trial . jam miw h >•.>!• io the totality" of 
ihe circumstances, no single factor being dispositive as 
matter of law, Walker, 790 P.2d at 93; the statute is intended 
»•> prev"* intoxicated J^'SOI^- fV->^  causing harm u^ 
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apprehending them before they operate a vehicle, Garcia, 645 
P.2d at 654; Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781; a person need not actually 
move, or attempt to move, a vehicle, but only needs to have an 
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in order to be 
in actual physical control Garcia, 645 P.2d at 654-55. 
Defendant argues that fundamentally the accused must have the apparent ability to 
start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control; this is an elementary 
element to the definition of 'actual physical control.'. Throughout the various cases 
within Utah, operability is a consistent theme. 
OTHER JURISDICITONS 
The definition employed by the Supreme Court of Montana has been widely 
adopted: 
"Using the term in 'actual physical control' in its composite sense, it means 
"existing' or "present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or 
regulation.'" State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958). Accord, Kansas 
City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Ghylin, 250 
N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 1977); Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375, 383 
1974); State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, 443 
(1971). 
The Alabama Court in Key v. Kinsey, 424So.2d701, 703-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1982) dealt with the accused's car out of gas and the keys with the defendant's son. The 
son was walking to get gas. The Court found the defendant not to be in actual physical 
control. They held the following elements to found for actual physical control: 
1. Active or constructive possession of the 
vehicle's ignition key by the person charged or, in 
the alternative, proof that such a key is not 
required for the vehicle's operation; 
11 
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2. Position of the person charged in the driver's 
seat, behind the steering wheel, and in such 
condition that, except for the intoxication, he or 
she is physically capable of starting the engine and 
causing the vehicle to move; 
3. A vehicle that is operable to some extent. * 
*This appears consistent with Garcia, Walker, Lopez. 
The term actual physical control was construed by the Missouri courts in City of 
Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App. 1976), as existing or present 
bodily restraint directing influence, domination or regulation of the automobile. See also 
State v. Liebhart 707 S.W.2d 427(Mo.App. 1986). In Bearden v. State, 430 P.2d 844, 
845-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967), the Court found no actual physical control where the 
defendant was found lying unconscious at the side of the road, outside his vehicle. 
Defendant argues that if the vehicle has no apparent ability to be started and 
move, the defendant cannot be in actual physical control. Here, the defendant could 
neither start nor move the Blazer. It required a tow truck to remove it. Even once pulled 
from the gorge, the Blazer would not start. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY RELATING THE 
ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL' CONTRARY TO THE 
APPELLATE COURT'S PRIOR DIRECTIVES. SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS 
ERROR 
12 
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The defense and the prosecution both submitted jury instructions defining 
'actual physical control' in accordance with Richfield City v. Walker, supra. These 
instructions varied little. The defense requested the following instruction: 
Instruction No. 
In considering whether the defendant had actual physical control of vehicle, you 
should consider the following factors: 
(1) Whether the defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; 
(2) The position of the automobile; 
(3) Whether the automobile's motor was running; 
(4) Whether the defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; 
(5) Whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; 
(6) Whether the defendant had possession of the ignition key; 
(7) Defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; 
(8) How the vehicle got to where it was found; and 
(9) Whether the defendant drove it there. 
These factors are not to be considered all-inclusive. 
However, the trial court, over objection, gave the following instruction: 
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual violates the provisions 
of our Driving Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or " in actual 
physical control" of a vehicle. "Driving" is the every-day definition as you may 
understand it. It means "to urge forward under guidance, compel to go in a 
particular direction or direct the course of. " 
"Actual physical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present 
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation. You may consider 
whether the defendant occupied the driver's position behind the steering wheel, 
had possession of the ignition key, and the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle in determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the 
vehicle. 
Your are instructed to be in " actual physical control of a motor vehicle, " the 
defendant need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle and 
the vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendants own 
choice, was placed behind the wheel. 
13 
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Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the 
determination of whether a person is in uphysical control" of the vehicle. A 
person may be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle when the vehicle is 
disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose from the act or behavior of the actor 
and the jury can conclude that the disabling action is contemporaneous with the 
intoxication of the Defendant. In other words, the focus of the jury determination 
should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it came 
to rest, but upon the status of the Defendant and the nature of the authority he or 
she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its 
inoperability, it can no longer move. Where circumstantial evidence permits a 
legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and was performing as it 
was because of the Defendant's choice, it follows that the Defendant was in actual 
physical control. 
The trial court incorrectly stated the law. The law defining 'actual physical 
control' has been set out and defined by Richfield City v. Walker and its predecessors. 
No basis existed for any deviation from the holdings of Richfield City v. Walker. 
DEGRADING THE BURDEN OF PROOF: 
The trial court's instruction in part provides: 
Where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was 
where it was and was performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice, it 
follows that the Defendant was in actual physical control. 
The instruction not only fails to properly define applicable law but it 
downgraded the burden of proof from a standard of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' to 
the burden of a "legitimate inference \ The trial court's instruction in the last paragraph 
allows the jury to find the defendant in 'actual physical control' when "circumstantial 
14 
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evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice". 
In State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held it 
was error to advise the jury that they could presume the reasonable and ordinary 
consequences of the defendant's acts. The instruction given there was as follows: 
1. Purpose or knowledge, being states of mind, are 
not always susceptible of proof by direct and 
positive evidence and must ordinarily be inferred 
from acts, conduct, statement, and circumstances. 
The law presumes that a person intends the 
reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own 
acts. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court, citing the language of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). held that when intent is an element of the 
crime charged, an instruction to the jury that "The law presumes that a 
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" violates the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Utah Court adopted the language of Sandstrom 
as follows: 
First, a reasonable jury could well have 
interpreted the presumption as "conclusive," that is, 
not technically as a presumption at all, but rather 
as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find 
intent once convinced of the facts triggering the 
presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have 
interpreted the instruction as a direction to find 
intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary 
15 
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actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unless 
the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of 
proof which may well have been considerably greater 
than "some" evidence — thus effectively shifting the 
burden of persuasion on the element of intent. 
DIMINISHING THE MENTAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME 
Trial court's instruction in part provides: 
Your are instructed to be in " actual physical control of a motor vehicle, " the 
defendant need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle and 
the vehicle need not be in motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendants own 
choice, was placed behind the wheel 
The trial court's instruction diminishes the mental element of the crime from a 
'knowing and intentional' act mandated by U.C.A. 76-2-102 to 'less than conscious 
volition' standard. Section 76-2-102 mandates that every offense not involving strict 
liability requires a culpable mental state. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the 
act need not even be a conscious volition. 
Further, the trial court's instruction suggests that it is enough for the defendant if 
he is in the car behind the steering wheel. This runs contrary to every decision issued the 
Utah Appellate Courts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Here the car was inoperable. The defendant possessed no ability to get in the car, 
start it and move. The officer had to enlist a tow truck to pull the car two hundred feet 
out of the gorge. Even after pulling it out of the gorge, the tow truck driver could not start 
the car. 
16 
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The officer had no knowledge of how the car got to this resting place. He had no 
knowledge of the defendant's intoxicated state except for the 35 minutes between arrival 
and arrest. He did not know how long the car had been at the location, whether that be 
hours or days. He had no idea if the defendant was the driver of the car when it went off 
road, and if he was the driver, if he was intoxicated 
The defendant possessed no ability to move the car. By such definition, the 
defendant was not in actual physical control of the car. 
The trial court's jury instruction was not only inconsistent in its own verbiage but 
contrary to current case law. It further diminished the burden of proof from 'reasonable 
doubt' to a 'legitimate inference' standard. The instruction was further confusing and 
inconsistent. It further allowed a conviction based on acts contrary to the Utah case law. 
Dated this 1st day of April, 2001 ^zZ^T7\t 
Attorngy for AppelljfauDefendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of motion and order to extend time to file 
appellant's brief to: 
Attorney General for the State of Utah (four copies) 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Court of Appeals (eighth copies) 
450 South State 
#500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Postage prepaid this ) day of April, 2003. 
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Addendum to Brief 
(1) Defendant's Requested Instruction. 
(2) Trial court's Instruction. 
a) 
Instruction NO. 
In considering whether the defendant had actual physical control of vehicle, you 
should consider the following factors: 
(1) Whether the defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; 
(2) The position of the automobile; 
(3) Whether the automobile's motor was running; 
(4) Whether the defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; 
(5) Whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; 
(6) Whether the defendant had possession of the ignition key; 
(7) Defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; 
(8) How the vehicle got to where it was found; and 
(9) Whether the defendant drove it there. 
These factors are not to be considered all-inclusive. 
(2) 
INSTRUCTION NO 
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual violates the provisions of our Driving 
Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or "in actual physical control" of a vehicle. 
"Driving" is the every-day definition as you may understand it. It means "to urge forward under 
guidance, compel to go in a particular direction or direct the course of." 
"Actual ohvsical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination or regulation. You may consider whether the defendant occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheel, had possession of the ignition key, and the apparent ability 
to start and move the vehicle in determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the 
vehicle. 
You are instructed that to be in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle," the defendant 
need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle, and the vehicle need not be in 
motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendant's own choice, was placed behind the wheel 
Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the determination of whether 
a person is in "physical control" of the vehicle. A person may be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle if that person is in the vehicle, behind the wheel. It is also possible for a person to be in 
phy'sfcaTbotifrof of if fnotor vehicle when the vehicle is disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose 
from the act or behavior of the actor and the jury can conclude that the disabling action is 
(contemporaneous with the intoxication of the Defendant. In other words, the focus of the jury 
determination should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it came to 
Page 6 cf 25 
rest, but upon the status of the Defendant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the 
vehicle in arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move 
Where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the vehicle was where it was and 
was performing as it was because of the Defendant's choice, it follows that the Defendant was in 
actual physical control 
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